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Purpose: 
The aim of this article was to analyse the retold experiences of 27 survivors 
from the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have examined verbal markers 
of reconciliation and implacability and analysed the described terms for 
reconciliation that are being actualized in the narratives.
Design/Methods/Approach: 
The material for the study was gathered through qualitative interviews with 27 
individuals who survived the war in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
study joins those narrative traditions within sociology where oral presentations 
are seen as both discursive- and experience-based. In addition, I perceive the 
concept of reconciliation as an especially relevant component in those specific 
stories that I analysed.
Findings:
Stories on implacability, reconciliation, and conditions for reconciliation 
are not shaped only in relation to the war as a whole but also in relation to an 
individual’s wartime actions and those of others. In these stories, implacability 
is the predominant feature, but reconciliation is said to be possible if certain 
conditions are met. Examples of these conditions are justice for war victims, 
perpetrator recognition of crimes, and emotional commitment from the perpetrator 
(by showing remorse and shame, for example).
Originality/Value:
Previous research on post-war society emphasized structural violence with 
subsequent reconciliation processes. Researchers have focused on the importance 
of narratives, but they have neither analysed conditions for reconciliation in 
post-war interviews. This article tries to fill this gap by analysing the stories told 
by survivors of the Bosnian war during the 1990s.
UDC: 341.38+94(497.6)
Keywords: reconciliation, narrative, forgiveness, implacability, conditions for 
reconciliation, justice
VARSTVOSLOVJE,
Journal of Criminal
Justice and Security,
year 17
no. 2
pp. 107‒126
108
Conditions for Reconciliation: Narratives of Survivors from the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Pogoji za spravo: pripoved preživelih iz vojne v Bosni in 
Hercegovini
Namen prispevka:
Namen prispevka je analizirati ponovno podane izkušnje 27-ih preživelih 
vojne v Bosni in Hercegovini v 90-ih letih prejšnjega stoletja. V pripovedih smo 
pregledali verbalne znake sprave in pomiritve ter analizirali opisane izraze za 
spravo.
Metode: 
Gradivo za raziskavo je bilo zbrano s kvalitativnimi intervjuji 27-ih 
posameznikov, ki so preživeli vojno v severozahodni Bosni in Hercegovini. 
Raziskava se pridružuje pripovedni tradiciji znotraj sociologije, v kateri so 
pripovedi osnovane tako na diskurzu kot na izkušnji. Še posebej pomembna 
komponenta v analiziranih zgodbah je koncept sprave.
Ugotovitve:
Zgodb o pomiritvi, spravi in pogojih za le to ne oblikuje le vojna, temveč 
tudi dejanja, ki jih v času vojne izvede tako pripovedovalec kot drugi ljudje. V 
omenjenih zgodbah prevladuje element pomiritve, sprava pa naj bi bila mogoča 
ob doseženih nekaterih pogojih. Primeri le teh so: pravica za žrtve vojne, priznanje 
kaznivih dejanj s strani storilca in čustvena zaveza storilca (ki se, na primer, kesa 
in sramuje).
Omejitve/uporabnost raziskave: 
Pretekle raziskave povojne družbe poudarjajo strukturno nasilje, kateremu 
sledijo procesi sprave. Raziskovalci se osredotočajo na pomen pripovedi, vendar 
v povojnih intervjujih ne analizirajo pogojev za spravo. Pričujoč članek poskuša 
zapolniti to vrzel z analizo pripovedi preživelih vojne v Bosni in Hercegovini v 
90-ih letih preteklega stoletja.
UDK: 341.38+94(497.6)
Ključne besede: sprava, pripoved, odpuščanje, pomiritev, pogoji za spravo, 
pravica
1 INTRODUCTION
Previous research on post-war society emphasized the structural violence with 
subsequent reconciliation processes, for example in South Africa (Sampson, 
2003), Rwanda (Applegate, 2012), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cehajic, Brown, 
& Castano, 2008). However, in reality there is usually overlap between actor and 
structure (Janover, 2005; Schaap, 2006; Simmel, 1955). 
Previous research on post-war society emphasizes the importance of 
narratives (Broz, 2008; Broz, Kain, & Elias-Bursac, 2005; Delpla, 2007; Ericsson, 
2011; Hagan & Levi, 2005; Hatzfeld, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Jansen, 2007; Mannergren 
Selimovic, 2010; Mannergren Selimovic & Eastmond, 2012; Skjelsbæk, 2007; 
Stefansson, 2010; Steflja, 2010), but these authors have not focused on narratives 
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about conditions for reconciliation in post-war interviews. This article tries to 
fill this gap by analysing stories told by survivors of the Bosnian war during the 
1990s. The research issue is with what normative orientations and from what social 
values do the assumptions behind the above questions draw upon for moral sense 
and social intelligibility, and how do these normative orientations and values then 
guide the actions of individuals as well as communities in post-war societies?
This article examines how survivors of the 1990s war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina describe reconciliation with their former enemies. In the analysis, 
voices representing the three ethnic groups involved in the war emerge: Bosniacs1, 
Serbs, and Croats. These individuals were living in northwestern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the war, and some of them still live there while others live in 
Scandinavian countries. 
What were the circumstances in northwestern Bosnia during the 1990s 
war? In their quest to expel Bosniacs and Croats from the area, Serbian police 
and militia carried out mass executions, systematic rape, and forced flight and 
established concentration camps. The aim was to remove the Croat and Bosniac 
population from the region by making life there impossible. Warfare was aimed 
directly against civilians. War antagonists often knew each other from before the 
war. Expelling individuals was not enough; the goal was to create an atmosphere 
so that no one ever would dare return (Bassiouni & Manikas, 1994; Case No.: 
IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve & Bergsmo, 1994). 
This article analyses the retold experiences of 27 survivors of the war in 
northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina. One partial aim is to analyse markers 
of reconciliation and implacability; the other is to describe the conditions for 
reconciliation being actualized in various descriptions. The overall research 
question asked is, how do the interviewees describe possibilities for post-war 
reconciliation and forgiveness? The research questions more precisely are actually 
deeper: Should a victim forgive someone who does not admit his crime? Does the 
right to forgiveness belong only to the victim and not, say, to an institution? And 
can a group ask for forgiveness on behalf of an individual when the individual 
does not?
In the following, I will try to illustrate how markers of reconciliation and 
implacability, together with described conditions for reconciliation, are highlighted 
when the interviewees draw attention to (a) war crimes, (b) perpetrators admitting 
crimes, and (c) perpetrator emotional commitment (for example, the display 
of remorse and shame). My analytical findings are presented in the following 
themes: (1) Implacability, (2) Reconciliation, (3) Condition for reconciliation, and 
(4) Negations – the past and the present. 
2 ANALYTIC STARTING POINTS
This study joins those narrative traditions within sociology where oral 
presentations are seen as both discursive and experience based (Potter, 2007). An 
1 During the war, Bosnian Muslims began to identify themselves as Bosniacs. The term ‘Bosniac’ is actually 
the old word for ‘Bosnian’, and now it is used both in an official context and in everyday language. 
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interactionally inspired perspective on human interaction, through symbols and 
an ethno-methodological perspective on human stories (Blumer, 1986; Garfinkel, 
1984), is a general starting point. In addition, I perceive the concept of reconciliation 
as an especially relevant component in those specific stories that I analysed. 
Simmel (1955) looks at social interaction as an interplay between humans – a 
reciprocity that can take on and display different special social shapes (Bernard, 
1950; Simpson, 1955). Conflicts and reconciliations, for example, are special shapes 
of interaction that become visible when analysing relations between individuals 
and groups after the fighting ends. Simmel (1955) argues that reconcilability is 
an emotional attitude aiming at ending a conflict. In contrast, a potential fighting 
spirit aims at upholding the conflict. Simmel (1955: 117) writes: 
“This wholly elementary and irrational tendency to conciliation is probably 
at work in the innumerable cases in which conflict does not end as the most 
merciless consequence of power relations. It is something quite different from 
weakness, gullibility, social morality, or love for one’s fellowman; it is not even 
identical with peacefulness. For, peacefulness avoids fighting from the start, or 
carries it on, once it is forced upon it, accompanied by the constant undercurrent 
of the need for peace.”
Simmel (1955) argues that peacefulness is a way to avoid struggle from the 
beginning and that reconciliation emerges only after the struggle has been carried 
out and finished. Forgiveness is the key element for reconciliation, and Simmel 
(ibid.) describes it as an exchange of emotions between people. He argues (Simmel, 
1955: 118): “that the feeling of antagonism, hatred, separateness yield to another 
feeling – in this respect, a mere resolution seems to be as powerless as it is in respect 
to feelings generally.” Simmel (1995) is saying that when reconciliation takes 
place, the feeling of hostility and conflict gives way to a feeling of peacefulness 
and consensus. Simmel (1955: 121–122) sees both reconciliation and implacability 
as types of emotions that need external conditions to be actualized:  
“[…] if one cannot forget, one cannot forgive and not fully reconcile oneself. 
If this were true, it would mean the most horrible irreconcilability /…/ image and 
after-effect of the conflict and of everything for which one had to reproach the 
other continue in consciousness and cannot be forgotten.”
Simmel (1955) continues arguing that those who cannot forget certain 
events are unable to forgive; in other words, they cannot reconcile fully. This 
situation is something that he interprets as ‘the most horrible irreconcilability’ 
because every reason for reconciliation has disappeared from that person’s 
consciousness. Forgiveness is possible only where there is someone who can be 
assumed or alleged guilty; in the words of Ricœur (2004: 460): “There can, in fact, 
be forgiveness only where we can accuse someone of something, presume him to 
be or declare him guilty.” Ricœur (2004: 466) also draws attention to the question 
of unforgivable crimes. By ‘unforgivable crimes’, he primarily means crimes that 
are characterized by the victims’ great suffering; secondly, crimes that can be tied 
to named perpetrators; and thirdly, when there is a personal connection between 
victim and perpetrator. 
Based on Simmel’s (1955) and Ricœur’s (2004) views on forgiveness, we can 
ask the following question: Can every crime be forgiven? Derrida (2004) reasons 
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as Ricœur (2004: 468), who writes: “Forgiveness is directed to the unforgivable 
or it does not exist. It is unconditional, it is without exception and without 
restriction.” Here a relationship between punishment and forgiveness is being 
raised. According to Ricœur (2004), when committing a crime, a perpetrator may 
be punished through a symbolic and actual marking of the injustice committed at 
the expense of somebody else – the victim (for instance, through law enforcement). 
Punishment creates a marginal space for forgiveness, because of unconditionality 
among other things, which is seen as an important condition according to Ricœur 
(2004). Derrida (2004: 45) also believes that unconditional forgiveness is virtually 
impossible: 
“[…] pure and unconditional forgiveness, in order to have its own meaning, 
must have no ‘meaning’, no finality, even no intelligibility. It is a madness of the 
impossible. It would be necessary to follow, without letting up, the consequence 
of this paradox, or this aporia.”
Two questions are especially interesting in this context: (1) Should a victim 
forgive someone who does not admit his crime, and (2) Does the right to forgive 
belong only to the victim, or even to someone else without a direct connection to 
the atrocity (an institution, for example)? 
Ricœur (2004) states normatively that the victim should forgive, trying to 
be considerate to the guilty party’s pride, and expect a latter recognition from 
him. Derrida (2004: 44) writes the following apropos a woman whose husband 
was murdered: “If anyone has the right to forgive, it is only the victim, and not 
a tertiary institution.” It seems that reconciliation also has an institutional side. 
Occasionally, we see politicians and leaders of religious communities step forward 
to apologize for actions that they personally did not commit. The question is, do 
these individuals have the right to apologize and, in that case, who has the right 
to forgive? Should a representative of another institution forgive or should it be 
the victim as the affected individual? Ricœur (2004) argues that true forgiveness 
should not be institutionalized. He believes that it is only the subjected victim 
who can forgive. 
We see from Ricœur’s (2004) and Derrida’s (2004) writings that reconciliation 
ideologies are often generally and indistinctly formulated. They usually consist of 
two levels – the institutional and the individual. The institutional is often based on 
the current government’s or regime’s efforts, with economic and administrative 
circumstances playing a prominent role (for instance, tribunals and truth 
commissions). The individual level (or interpersonal level) concerns how victim 
and perpetrator, through inevitable interaction, discard their former roles – how 
the perpetrator asks for forgiveness and the victim struggles to forgive. Here there 
is often no institutional base, and individuals are highly dependent on their own 
ability to forgive past events and reconcile. 
Christie (2004) discusses what importance truth commissions and 
international tribunals have for reconciliation (for instance, the Hague tribunal 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina tribunal on war crime2). Christie (2004) argues that 
2 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY] (2015a, 2015b); Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (2015).
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by punishing those guilty for war crimes, international tribunals are ‘killing’ the 
ideology behind the atrocities. He illuminates his reasoning with the Nuremberg 
trials in which German Nazi leaders faced accusations and the Nazi ideology was 
convicted and punished through the individual sentences against those involved 
in the atrocities. Christie’s point is that a better result regarding reconciliation 
is achieved through a truth commission instead of legally punishing individuals 
singled out as war criminals (perpetrators described as monsters) – all this 
provided that the truth commission’s operation is carried out without economic 
or political problems or disruptions preventing the commission’s work. 
Reconciliation is a comprehensive and exciting theme of my analysis. The 
perspectives of the mentioned theorists, although they sometimes are slightly 
abstract and normative as well as distant from people’s complex and perhaps 
contradictory experiences, are useful for my ambition of trying to understand 
the interviewees’ stories of forgiveness, reconciliation, irreconcilability, and 
conditions for reconciliation, both as an analytical starting point and a subject of 
nuances. 
3 METHOD
The material for the study was gathered through qualitative interviews with 27 
individuals who survived the war in northwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
material was gathered in two phases. 
During the first phase, March through November 2004, I completed my 
fieldwork in Ljubija, a community in northwestern Bosnia3. I interviewed 14 
individuals who were living in Ljubija at that time and conducted observations in 
coffee shops, at bus stops, in the marketplace, and on buses. Two women and five 
men who all stayed in Ljubija during and after the war were interviewed together 
with three women and four men from Ljubija who were expelled during the war 
but now have moved back. Six of the fourteen interviewees are of Serbian origin, 
three were Croat, and five were Bosniac. 
In the second phase, from April through June 2006, I interviewed nine former 
concentration camp detainees who, despite being civilians during the war, were 
placed in the camps by Serbian soldiers and police. These individuals, together 
with four of their relatives who also were interviewed, now live in Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway. Three of the interviewees were women and ten were men. 
The majority of the interviewees come from the municipality of Prijedor (of which 
Ljubija is a part). Ten are Bosniacs and three are Croats. Some of the collected 
3 Ljubija is a community in northwestern Bosnia (belonging to the municipality of Prijedor). Before 
the war, the inhabitants of Ljubija lived in two local administrative entities (Mjesne zajednice). 
Gornja (upper) Ljubija was ethnically mixed, and most inhabitants lived in apartment buildings. 
In Donja (lower) Ljubija, most inhabitants were Bosniacs who predominately lived in private 
houses. The area where Ljubija is located is known for its mineral wealth, especially iron ore, black 
coal, quartz, clay for brick burning, and mineral-rich water. Most people worked at the Ljubija iron 
mine before the war. War struck Ljubija in the beginning of summer 1992 when Serbian soldiers 
took control of the local administration without armed resistance (Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: 
IT-99-36-T).
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material has been analysed in earlier reports and articles (Basic, 2005, 2007, 2013, 
2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
Since 2004, I have repeatedly reused the empirical material. Understanding 
this repetitive analysis requires looking back at the research process. During the 
interviews, the narrators (interviewees) and I interacted as conversation partners 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). Among other things, I was interested in how the 
individual was going to present herself or himself in different situations, how 
certain situations merged with other situations to create social rituals, how the 
individual defined certain situations, and how the individual’s identity was 
created, preserved, and re-created. I also examined how social symbols such as 
language participate in the creation of cultural context. Blumer (1986) argues that 
symbols are social objects that are given a certain meaning. The meaning does 
not have to be precisely the same for all; individuals interpret symbols of others 
and in this way try to give them some significance. After transcription of the 
stories in the Bosnian language, another meaning was added, not to the narrator 
but to the empirical material. Thereafter, selected parts were translated into the 
Swedish language by an interpreter. It was both interesting and problematic that 
the meaning was different in Swedish compared to the Bosnian version, with 
certain nuances lost in translation. Now I have restarted the process by analysing 
the English language version. Åkerström, Jacobsson, and Wästerfors (2004) argue 
that empirical material from completed research sometimes, for different reasons, 
can linger in a researcher’s mind. In some instances, this persistence is about 
fascination for a field of research or odd circumstances during the collection of 
the material, for example. These researchers argue that empirical material can 
be re-analysed again and again through the same or a different set of analytical 
goggles, and in this sense, the material can always add something new. When I 
conducted this new analysis of the previously collected material, I was surprised 
by the narrators’ focus on different conditions for reconciliation during interviews, 
a tendency I partially overlooked in my previous analyses. 
4 IMPLACABILITY
The Bosnian stories of reconciliation and implacability are not shaped only in 
relation to the war but also in relation to the narrators’ own and other individuals’ 
personal war actions. The interactive dynamics of war portrays reconciliation as 
something dependent on various charged symbols. These charges often paint a 
picture of implacability. 
Stories of reconciliation and implacability from post-war Bosnia often start 
with the interviewee talking about revenge and hate. During the war, one man, 
named Sveto4 in the study, participated in a Serbian militia group. Nowadays, he 
owns a business in northwestern Bosnia (field note). He described an execution 
that occurred after the war, which seemed to have originated from the war: 
Sveto: He walks in and asks him: ‘Have you finished your beer?’ ‘Yes, I have’; when 
the answer was given, this fellow takes out a gun and shoots him in the head. He then 
4 Names have all been changed.
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went outside and the pub-maid tried to escape, but he told her: ‘You don’t have to flee, call 
the police ‘cause I have settled my business.’ He sat down in front of the shop waiting for 
the police. When they arrived, they took his gun from him. It is said that this man raped 
his sister in Sanski Most5 during the war. /.../ When this comes alive, when people free 
themselves from that pressure, they will remember who killed their father, brother, uncle. 
Lots of things will come forth in time. Bodies are still getting excavated, people are looking 
for them. One day, when it all is accounted for, you will see the perpetrator driving by in 
his car and your dead brothers’ children will appear before your eyes. 
Sveto’s story is imbued with an attitude of implacability. In his portrayal, 
we see how the post-war years are being charged with the importance of the war 
years – one will see someone ‘driving by in his car’ and identify this person with 
his previous atrocities. Stories of hate and revenge, as a direct result from the 
war, return in several interviews. One example is given by Milanko. He was a 
child during the war, and he told me that he witnessed his neighbors – Bosniacs 
and Croats – getting beaten and executed. Nowadays, he works in a factory in 
northwestern Bosnia. Milanko told the following about the widespread violence 
during the war and post-war vindictiveness: 
Milanko: In 1992, Rade was not here, he was in Germany. He and Dragan were 
friends. Dragan came to Rade’s parents, he stole their money and abducted Rade’s brother 
Zuti. First, he physically abused Zuti, then Zuti disappeared without a trace. Rade told me 
that Dragan won’t live to get old. 
Goran: Where is this Dragan nowadays?
Milanko: Somewhere outside, he is hiding in his village. He does not dare come to 
Prijedor now that many people, like Rade, come here completely unimpeded.
Goran: Is there any information about Zuti?
Milanko: It is known that he was in Keraterm6 and that Dragan went there and 
brought him out again. Nothing is known of him since that. The lakes in which we 
swim, there by the mine, are full of corpses. They get drunk in the bars and start talking, 
thousands have been thrown in there. The lake is deep, more than 100 meters. Who could 
dive down there now to collect all of them (corpses)? It makes me sick, they put on the 
uniform and drive out to the villages to rape and kill women. Not just Dragan but also 
Sveto and Milorad and lots of others. How do they sleep now, do they worry about their 
children?
Gangas (2004) argues that Simmel’s views on conflicts and reconciliation 
partly actualize the involvement of the actors’ morals, norms, and valuations. 
These post-war stories of violence and rejecting those actions could be seen as 
an expression of future morality (Jansen, 2002). In the previous stories, we see 
how Sveto’s and Milanko’s morals emerge as a rejection from the war morality 
in which rape, abduction, robbery, and murder were a part of everyday life 
(Bassiouni & Manikas, 1994; Case No.: IT-97-24-T; Case No.: IT-99-36-T; Greve 
& Bergsmo, 1994). This rejection is clearest through the dramatic shape it takes. 
In Milanko’s narration, among other things, we see the conflict being described 
5 Sanski Most is a community in northwestern Bosnia. 
6 Keraterm is a concentration camp in northwestern Bosnia.
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through a personalized terminology (‘Rade,’ ‘Zuti,’ ‘Dragan,’ ‘Sveto,’ ‘Milorad’) 
and maybe because of these personalized illustrations through a rather implacable 
terminology. 
Sveto and Milanko retell war crimes in which personal relationships among 
the deceased, surviving victims, and perpetrators are portrayed – they are not 
strangers. This proximity between perpetrator and victim seems to make Sveto 
and Milanko pessimistic about post-war reconciliation in Bosnia. Their reasoning 
is consistent with that of Simmel (1955: 121–122), who argues that someone who 
cannot forget different events cannot reconcile because reconciliation requires 
forgiveness. Sveto and Milanko appear to argue that people’s consciousness 
cannot be erased after a trauma, and this, using Simmel’s words, creates ‘the most 
horrible irreconcilability’.
5 RECONCILIATION
Hatzfeld (2005a, 2005b, 2008) narrates the telling conversations with survivors 
of the 1990s war in Rwanda. The author mentions international tribunals and 
truth commissions through the analysis. These, of course, are institutions. One 
interesting question is why truth commissions were not established in Bosnia, 
following the models of South Africa or gacaca courts in Rwanda. Hatzfeld (2005a, 
2005b, 2008) means that in Rwanda, the ideology responsible for the genocide was 
put on trial rather than the individuals. If we follow the Hatzfeld (2005a, 2005b, 
2008) reasoning, in Bosnia, the war criminals as individuals are put on trial at the 
Hague Tribunal and the Bosnia and Herzegovina tribunal on war crimes (Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015; ICTY, 2015a, 2015b) rather than the ideology that 
guided them. This analytical point is partly in contrast with Christie (2004), who 
argues that by punishing those guilty for war crimes, international tribunals are 
‘killing’ the ideology behind the atrocities. 
Schaap (2006) and Janover (2005), much like Ricœur (2004) and Derrida 
(2004), present the image of reconciliation ideologies as often being general and 
unclearly formulated. They argue that on an institutional level, reconciliation can 
be ideologized, frequently based on the current government’s or regime’s efforts. 
An important point observed by Schaap (2006) and Janover (2005) is that activities 
on an institutional level often are transferred to the individual level. In my 
empirical material, the stories appear to be influenced by the regimes regarding 
the ‘war ideology destruction‘ (Christie, 2004), which is taking place at the Hague 
Tribunal and the Bosnia and Herzegovina tribunal on war crimes (Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 2015; ICTY, 2015a, 2015b). 
The majority of Bosniac and Croat organizations for war victims accept and 
appreciate the effort of the tribunals, in contrast to the Serbian organizations, 
which often renounce it. Serbian war victims see the tribunal as partisan (Delpla, 
2007). The majority of indicted and convicted persons at the tribunal are Serbian 
politicians, soldiers, and police (Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015; ICTY, 
2015a, 2015b). Regional discussions often stress the importance of justice being 
done after the war. What is not clearly stated in the discourse is that this justice 
enforcement also may entrench the antagonism and social identities that emerged 
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during the war (Hagan & Levi, 2005; Massey, Hodson, & Sekulić, 1999; Steflja, 
2010). 
Justice for war victims is one of the most important conditions for 
reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Basic, 2015a; Ericsson, 2011; Hagan 
& Levi, 2005; Mannergren Selimovic, 2010; Mannergren Selimovic & Eastmond, 
2012; Skjelsbæk, 2007; Stefansson, 2010). Many war criminals are detained by the 
Hague tribunal and the Bosnia and Herzegovina tribunal on war crimes; several 
have been convicted for crimes committed during the war, but many are still at 
large. Ricœur (2004) argues that forgiveness is possible only when one or several 
are singled out as guilty. Similar arguments emerge with most of the interviewees 
in this study. To achieve reconciliation in Bosnia, forgiveness is required and, from 
what I saw in the interviewees’ stories, it is easier to forgive someone who is in 
prison for his crimes. During the war, Radovan was called into the Serbian militia, 
but he could not participate because of his illness. Nowadays, he is retired and 
living in northwestern Bosnia; he says indignantly that ‘the task must be done, if 
one wants to reconcile’:
The first thing that needs to be done, if you want reconciliation, is to bring the 
war criminals to justice. Even if it was my own late father, I would have wanted him 
to take responsibility if he had murdered a civilian, in front of a firing squad or in jail. 
Who gives one the right to rape someone’s sister and mother or to murder someone? The 
sentences passed in the Hague are a joke. A 10-year sentence is transformed into 6 years 
for good behaviour. Without justice and by that I mean real justice /…/ there can be no 
reconciliation.
Radovan’s recipe for reconciliation is based on justice for the victim and 
punishment for the perpetrator or the idea of a punishment visible for all, 
that must be displayed as a ceremony or a spectacle (in this context, compare 
Collins, 1992; Durkheim, 1964). At the same time, Christie (2004) believes that 
there will be a better reconciliation result if the victim and perpetrator meet in 
front of a mediator and an audience. This public process creates a situation in 
which the perpetrator is ashamed instead of being legally punished; thus, justice 
is done for the victim. Christie (2004, 2005) argues by referring to the hanging 
of the commander of the Auschwitz-Birkenau extermination camp at the end of 
World War II. Christie (ibid.) finds it difficult to see the proportionality of the 
punishment in relation with the crime – one life in exchange for half a million who 
were gassed, tormented, and starved to death or killed in other frightful ways in 
that camp. Christie (ibid.) sees the hanging of the commander as yet another way 
of humiliating the victims. According to Christie’s (ibid.) formulation, all of the 
survivors should have been enabled to speak about what happened there – they 
should have been enabled to give vent to their rage, their sorrow, their desire for 
revenge. The commander should also tell how he saw it and what he did and 
share his current thoughts on these events. All of this should occur in front of an 
audience. 
I was influenced by Christie’s (ibid.) perspective while gathering material 
and therefore asked during the interview of a former concentration camp 
detainee a question inspired by the South African truth commission. Sanel’s 
health is damaged from repeated physical abuse, starvation, and anxiety in the 
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concentration camp. He is retired and lives in Scandinavia. These are his words 
on the conditions for reconciliation: 
Sanel: That all those, I don’t want to say war criminals but all those who had 
something to do with this evil, to come forward in order to get judged. Everyone should 
confess to what they have done, physical abuse, rape, murder, etcetera, thus it would not be 
important where they were judged, they could be judged at their own court in Banja Luka7. 
Goran: What about giving them pardon if they confessed on television?
Sanel: For the murders, too?
Goran: Yes.
Sanel: Well, regarding physical abuse and such, it would probably be OK but not 
murder. For murder, you have to spend time in jail according to the court’s sentence. 
/.../ You cannot slaughter people with such pleasure and just say sorry, it is simply not 
possible. You can forgive someone for beating you up but not for killing your brother. 
The individual’s depictions of their war memories are often contradictory 
and ambivalent (Jansen, 2007; Mannergren Selimovic, 2010; Mannergren 
Selimovic & Eastmond, 2012; Skjelsbæk, 2007; Stefansson, 2010). In some cases, 
the interviewees’ narratives in this study are also contradictory and ambivalent. 
The narrators oscillate between different identities and perspectives, depending 
on the situations, relations, and questions they face. In one and the same sentence, 
or paragraph, they can express two completely different opinions. 
Sanel, just like Radovan, delineates a sort of reconciliation recipe that seems 
to influence Bosnian people on an everyday basis: One of the most important 
conditions for reconciliation is justice for the victims of war. Earlier, I mentioned 
Ricœur (2004), who believes that forgiveness is possible only where there is 
someone who is presumed guilty. On the other hand, the point made by Ricœur 
(2004) and Derrida (2004) on forgiveness and punishment is that there is not much 
room for forgiveness, partly because of the unconditionality, which is seen as an 
important postulate for forgiveness. Sanel is putting up demands that must be 
met before he forgives and reconciles (‘all those who had something to do with 
this evil, to come forward in order to get judged’); he will not forgive just like that. 
Obtaining amnesty by confessing on television could be interpreted as a lowering 
of Sanel’s conditions at the expense of the perpetrator’s undergoing disgrace. 
Christie (2004) advocates a truth commission instead of punishing the guilty 
individuals. The idea of a truth commission is not to condemn a criminal but to 
give him an opportunity to express shame for his action and thereby be forgiven. 
The criminal shall be offered reentry into the community through his display. 
Even in the context of a truth commission, a perpetrator’s plea for forgiveness (for 
example, on television) could be understood as conditional: Participation in a truth 
commission lets the perpetrator avoid a judicial trial and potential punishment. 
Simmel (1955) writes that someone who cannot forgive cannot fully reconcile. 
Forgiveness by punishment is ruled out because of unconditionality (Derrida, 2004; 
Ricœur, 2004). Conditionality is present in all stories on post-war reconciliation. 
Sanel’s question of forgiveness and reconciliation is conditioned by the crimes 
he suffered during the war. Through a public confession and apology on the 
7 Banja Luka is a town in northwestern Bosnia.
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television, Sanel may consider forgiving physical assault – but not murder. If we 
merge the perspectives of Simmel (1955), Ricœur (2004), and Derrida (2004), we 
could say that Sanel’s reconciliation is not complete. We could also say that Sanel 
is criticizing the reconciliation manual advocated by Simmel (1955) and others. 
Variation is a very interesting dynamic at the interpersonal level of 
reconciliation. Relatives of survivors often want to co-exist in peace with 
former enemies, with or without forgiveness and reconciliation. It seems that 
forgiveness and reconciliation are not mandatory after a war. Nor is it certain that 
reconciliation includes forgiveness (Arendt, 1998; Borneman, 2003; Hagan & Levi, 
2005; Sampson, 2003). In the previous quotations, a resistance against forgiveness 
emerges, in which Sanel obviously reacts strongly to the questions about whether 
he is ready to forgive. Sanel answers by mentioning examples of difficult personal 
experiences and more or less explicitly shows the impossibility of forgiveness in 
relation to these experiences. It seems that ‘conditioned reconciliation’ could be 
interpreted as a resistance to or option of reconciliation based on forgiveness.
6 CONDITION FOR RECONCILIATION
What is required to make Sanel’s reconciliation complete? Is it that those who 
participated in the atrocities admit to emotions such as remorse and shame when 
they ask their victims for forgiveness? The interviewee stories are imbued with 
conditionality when they speak about reconciliation following the Bosnian war. 
Among other things, they highlight the importance of emotional commitment 
from the perpetrator – the perpetrator’s display of remorse and shame. In addition, 
a collective responsibility for war actions is noted when conditions are imposed. 
An illustrative example is found from Ljubo, who worked in an elementary school 
in northwestern Bosnia during the war, as well as after. This is Ljubo’s version of 
a possible reconciliation in Bosnia: 
But honestly, if one repents honestly and everyone is held accountable for their 
actions, I for mine, you for yours, and the third person for his, and we all apologize to 
one another, but it must come from the heart and with tears, this way there might lead to 
reconciliation. /.../ Remorse from all three sides, because one cannot be responsible for the 
war if the other did not participate. They must have quarrelled with each other because if 
there was no quarrel, they would not have made war. 
Ljubo’s version emphasizes two central aspects for making reconciliation 
possible. One is the individual’s emotional commitment (‘it must come from the 
heart and with tears’), and the second is reciprocity in reconciliation (‘remorse 
from all three sides’). He presents a kind of blueprint for reconciliation in which 
the individual and collective levels are interconnected. He presents and links the 
individual level to emotions that need to be shown, and he links the collective 
level to a universal war guilt (‘all three sides’). Another empirical example, in 
which reconciliation is conditioned with the perpetrator’s emotional commitment 
together with a collective responsibility, is found in the interview with Rifet. Rifet 
is a former concentration camp detainee, retired and living in Scandinavia, just 
like Sanel. Rifet says indignantly: 
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I could never reconcile with those who harassed me but would not take revenge either. 
They are the ones being small now, now when I travel to Banja Luka, I meet with people 
with whom I have always been a good friend, but those who did wrong, they stay away from 
me. They did not have to help me during the war, but they should have left me in peace. It 
is hard for them not being able to sit at my table and have a drink with me like before. One 
of these came up to me and said hello, but I told him to go to hell. The Serbs sitting at my 
table did the same and this was the worst for him. You should have been a man when it was 
at its worst, they said. But I would never take revenge, God forbid. I think it is bad enough 
for him when people ignore him like that. /.../ The Serbs are ashamed now, this is normal if 
you have an ounce of honour. Even though you tell them that they, personally, did not do 
anything. There are rotten ones even among my people, but what does that have to do with 
me? Whoever imprisoned, raped, or killed someone is a disgrace to his people. I despise 
those because they are neither Bosniacs, Serbs, nor Croats, they are scum. /.../ My message 
is this: You have to put all of that behind you and move on. Without reconciliation, there 
will be no life for us nor for Bosnia. But everything will be all right in the end, it must be, 
for the economy and everything else. This bond between us is a bond of fate. 
Rifet’s reasonably conciliatory attitude is still imbued with a ‘we’ and ‘the 
others’ division and a categorization of individuals based on their actions during 
the war. This can be seen as Rifet’s way of making his own position stronger 
with the aid of special symbolic expressions that are common for members of the 
groups. Rifet generates his own abstract world in which the members can feel 
safe by creating symbols for each group (‘Bosniacs,’ ‘Serbs,’ ‘Croats’). This symbol 
creation can be seen as an important condition for achieving reconciliation. 
Emotions are a permanent part of all interaction, and it seems that communication 
together with defining common symbolic expressions – with the display of correct 
emotions – enables cooperation even between enemies, and in some cases even 
reconciliation. 
Rifet stresses the importance of the perpetrator’s display of shame (‘are 
ashamed now, this is normal if you have an ounce of honour’). Braithwaite (2006a) 
believes that the individual who committed the crime shows displeasure through 
shame, which in turn could evoke other emotions such as grief, guilt, remorse, 
and once again – shame. There are, according to Braithwaite (ibid.), two varieties 
of shame, namely disintegrative shame and reintegrative shame. Disintegrative 
shame works negatively through stigmatization and expulsion of criminals, thus 
generating a group of individuals who are excluded from the community. In 
other words, the individual is branded as a criminal and loses the right to be a 
part of the community (for example, through imprisonment and the subsequent 
stigmatization). Reintegrative shame has more of a positive effect – the individual 
is not condemned and branded even if the action is punished. The individual is 
enabled to atone for his crimes and ‘be forgiven,’ which can be seen as a way to 
show and offer the individual reentry into the community through stimuli and 
aid. Braithwaite’s book is implicitly permeated with a view on disintegrative and 
reintegrative shame as an emotion, but it is not expressed explicitly. In a later 
publication, this viewpoint, stating that these varieties of shame are emotions, is 
clarified (compare Braithwaite, 2006b). 
Rifet points out that the war criminals are shameful now, and he stipulates 
a kind of exclusion shame that works by stigmatization and expulsion of the 
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criminals. This means that Rifet, on one hand, condemns the individual’s crimes, 
and on the other hand, strips him of his right to be a part of the group (‘people 
ignore him’). 
Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012) have, like Hutchison and Bleiker (2008) 
and also Klain and Pavic (2002), studied different functions that emotions have 
for forgiveness and reconciliation. An individual can present a specific image of 
himself or herself through displayed emotions, create and re-create identities, or 
attack the identities of the others. Rifet’s story is emotional, and he recounts that the 
others are ashamed now or should be ashamed. In this way, he creates a collective 
and morally ‘correct’ identity for himself and his friends and rejects his former 
friends (‘those who harassed’ him during the war). The shame that Rifet actualizes 
in his story seems to be able to generate reconciliation on a macro level; here a 
single perpetrator is sacrificed to achieve forgiveness and reconciliation between 
the groups (‘This bond between us is a bond of fate’). It is rather special that Rifet 
sees this Simmel-inspired bond. Broz et al. (2005) and Broz (2008) analysed their 
interviews with people who survived the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
conclusion of those studies was that the Yugoslav identity as cultural heritage is 
often represented in the Bosnian post-war stories (Broz, 2008; Broz et al., 2005). 
Rifet refers to a kind of Yugoslav connection – despite everything – but similar 
perspectives did not emerge from the other analysed narratives. 
7 NEGATIONS – THE PAST AND THE PRESENT
The stories of forgiveness and reconciliation, much like the stories of implacability, 
are connected to the past; the interactive consequences of war-time violence are 
intimately linked to the narrator’s war experiences. The interviewees distance 
themselves from some individuals or described situations. It is common that 
the portrayal of possible forgiveness and reconciliation is transformed into a 
depicted implacable attitude, and the interviewees thus negotiate their stances: 
They articulate between reconciliation and implacability statements. In these 
stories, ‘the others’ are presented as external actors in the context (see the 
following: former friends who did not intervene and perpetrators who killed 
someone’s father). Ivo exemplifies this in his story. He is a former concentration 
camp detainee who, during the interview, implied that he could ‘forgive’ Serbian 
friends and acquaintances who did not help him when he was captured. 
Those from Prijedor did not abuse me physically nor did they do me any other harm. 
In a way, they helped out but not really. That day they did not. Still, one has a soul, one can 
forgive them. I am better off without them, the less I have to do with them the better. /.../ 
Someone who had known me all my life could have tried to help me get away, but no one 
did. What actually happened, if people pointed us out or placed us on lists, I don’t know. 
Anyway, I terminated everything concerning them, have no desire, don’t want anything 
from them, I don’t need them. 
The picture painted by Ivo expresses a powerful polarization between 
categories. On one hand, we have Ivo; on the other, we have his friends and 
acquaintances who did not help him although they could have. Ivo is portraying 
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a distance towards his pre-war friends, and no closeness between the categories is 
displayed. I asked the following question of another concentration camp detainee, 
called Safet here, whose 80-year-old father was tortured before being killed during 
the war in northwestern Bosnia: ‘In which case would you be able to forgive or 
reconcile with what happened?’ His answer: 
Safet: We have already reconciled because we travel to Bosnia every year; this shows 
that we love Bosnia and that we are trying to return to some kind of normal life, a normal 
way ahead. To forgive … this … I only had one father, and he was killed unjustly, without 
doing wrong, you can never forgive that.
Goran: So it is thus about what you suffered? It is probably easier to forgive a slap 
than ...?
Safet: Yes, that is easier. Maybe you have heard that they killed the teacher Krupic, 
from Hambarine, his former pupil asked him if he remembered giving him the lowest grade 
10 years ago? I suppose there were many of those who lacked wits and got hold of weapons. 
According to Safet, this annual trip to Bosnia means conciliation, or maybe 
even reconciliation. This trip takes Safet to an area in which his former enemies 
now constitute the majority population. He meets them every day, perhaps even 
those who tortured and killed his father. Safet is keen to highlight that he could 
never forgive such an unjust crime as his father’s murder. Simmel (1955) argues 
that someone who cannot forgive does not fully reconcile. By turning from a 
reconcilable conversation (‘We have already reconciled’) to an implacable tone (‘I 
only had one father and he was killed unjustly /.../ you can never forgive that’), 
Safet creates a contrasting category, namely the category of ‘those who lacked 
wits and got hold of weapons’. 
Simmel (1955) describes conflict as an interplay of proximity and distance 
between actors. Applegate (2012), Cehajic et al. (2008), and Millar (2012), all of 
whom have studied reconciliation after the wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone, show that the relationship between victim and perpetrator is characterized 
by a combination of dissociation and closeness together with competition between 
the victim and perpetrator categories. In Ivo’s and Safet’s depictions, there is a 
similar relationship – the actors’ stories describe ‘them’ as distant. The actors are 
portrayed as participants in two entities that compete on a symbolic level. The 
narratives on reconciliation seem to become an arena for different disconnects 
between us/we and the others. Turns from a reconcilable to an implacable attitude 
reproduce a certain competition because they keep alive those symbols of battle 
and demarcations that were so obviously played out during the war. 
If we were to interlink different perspectives of theorists mentioned in this 
article, we could infer that the actors’ narratives play an important role in a tense 
network of everyday interaction. In this interaction, communal legal actions 
and politics together with the moral perspectives of the individuals and their 
identity labour are combined as the individual struggles with the question: Shall 
I forgive and reconcile? Janover (2005) emphasizes the importance of studying 
the stories of both victims and perpetrators. By telling their stories, victims can 
restore their status and attain a certain level of self-esteem and recognition of their 
identities. The perpetrators, by telling their stories, can explain to themselves and 
an audience; they can show their emotions and open a possibility of re-entering 
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into the community. Without this type of process, the victims are at risk of living 
in an existence without peace and serenity, and the perpetrators are at risk of 
permanently being bound by their committed atrocities – which Simmel (1955: 
121) calls ‘the most horrible irreconcilability’. In my analysis, I found that the 
possibility for forgiveness usually dies when the atrocity occurs, when a father is 
killed or a sister is raped.
8 CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to analyse the retold experiences of 27 survivors from 
the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have examined verbal markers of 
reconciliation and implacability and analysed the described terms for reconciliation 
that are being actualized in the narratives. Previous research on post-war society 
emphasized the structural violence with subsequent reconciliation processes, 
as in South Africa (Sampson, 2003), Rwanda (Applegate, 2012), and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Cehajic et al., 2008). Researchers have emphasized the importance 
of narratives (Broz, 2008; Broz et al., 2005; Delpla, 2007; Ericsson, 2011; Hagan 
& Levi, 2005; Hatzfeld, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Jansen, 2007; Mannergren Selimovic, 
2010; Mannergren Selimovic & Eastmond, 2012; Skjelsbæk, 2007; Stefansson, 
2010; Steflja, 2010), but they have not focused on narratives about conditions for 
reconciliation in post-war interviews. This article tries to fill this gap by analysing 
stories told by survivors of the Bosnian war during the 1990s. The research 
issue is from which normative orientations and from what social values the 
assumptions draw for moral sense and social intelligibility, and how do these 
normative orientations and values then guide the actions of individuals as well as 
communities in post-war societies?
The war as a whole (its structure and its political character) and individuals’ 
wartime actions are not independent of each other. Personal troubles are addressed 
in relation to social issues like reconciliation. Post-war reconciliation in Bosnia is 
closely connected to the war period. The reconciliation process seems to correlate 
with the war period’s interactive dynamics, and events taking place during the 
war affect interpretations regarding a possible reconciliation. 
This analysis used, among others, Simmel (1955), Ricoeur (2004), and Derrida 
(2004). Their use is not typical for scholarly discussions of interviews, and for this 
reason, I intend for the study to cast a fresh light on the existing literature. 
The struggle has to end before reconciliation takes place, Simmel (1955) 
argues, and the difficulty of ‘forgetting’ war memories in many cases seems to 
generate an unforgiving attitude – especially when the stories are specific and 
emotionally strong with a concrete course of events and filled with names of 
individuals and places (for example, ‘Rade,’ ‘Zuti,’ ‘Dragan,’ ‘Keraterm’). 
Atrocities during the war also raise the question of unforgivable crimes. 
Ricœur (2004) and Derrida (2004) believe that forgiveness either includes ‘the 
unforgivable’ or it does not exist. This study shows that some violent war crimes 
are described as particularly difficult to forgive. The analysis of the interactive 
consequences of violence shows that it is intimately associated with earlier personal 
experiences. Anger is sometimes expressed with charged emotional terms, with 
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very little space for reconciliation, and guilt sometimes gets transferred onto the 
whole category (not only the individual/individuals who committed atrocities). 
The features of reconciliation seen in the interviewees’ stories are imbued 
with conditionality. Forgiveness and reconciliation are depicted as possible to 
achieve but only if guilty war criminals are punished and also show remorse and 
shame for their atrocities. 
It seems that one of the most important conditions leading to reconciliation 
in post-war Bosnia is justice for the war victims. Many war criminals have been 
arrested or convicted by the Hague tribunal and the Bosnia and Herzegovina war 
crime tribunal for crimes committed during the war, but many are still at large. 
Simmel (1955) argues that forgiveness is required to achieve reconciliation. The 
picture that emerges from the analysed narratives is that it is easier to forgive 
someone imprisoned for his atrocities.
Reconciliation through a truth committee to which the perpetrators confess 
their crimes as an alternative to judicial punishment is based on the idea of 
exposing a perpetrator’s feeling of remorse and shame (Braithwaite, 2006a; 
Christie, 2004). The purpose of these feelings is not to condemn the criminal but 
to give him a possible way out by showing remorse and shame for his actions 
and thus ‘being forgiven’. Even here, there is a visible condition, namely, through 
participation in a truth commission, the perpetrator avoids a judicial trial and 
potential punishment. The interviewees did not like the idea that participants in 
a truth commission avoided being punished, i.e., they were sceptical of this path 
leading to reconciliation.
In the stories on reconciliation, it is highlighted that the perpetrators now 
are shameful (or should be ashamed) and an expulsive shame is stipulated that 
aims at stigmatizing and excluding single perpetrators. In this way, one not only 
condemns the misdeeds but also points out the individual as a criminal who 
has lost the right to be a part of the collective. This kind of shame, when single 
perpetrators are ‘sacrificed’ to achieve reconciliation between groups, is presented 
as reconciliation on a macro-level.
An interesting question that could not be resolved in this article is what the 
limits are in models of international tribunals and truth commissions. In this sense, 
I mean that sociology can address the dysfunctionality of both processes. Another 
interesting aspect of the problem that could not be investigated in this study is 
how the various actors in the reconciliation fare in the future. What significance 
will be awarded to the reconciliation question in Bosnian society?
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